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CLD-326        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2005 
___________ 
 
WALIYYUDDIN S. ABDULLAH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE SMALL BUSINESS BANKING DEPARTMENT OF BANK OF AMERICA; THE 
SMALL BUSINESS BANKING DEPARTMENT WELLS FARGO BANK 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:13-cv-00305) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 2 
 
 Waliyyuddin Abdullah, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals pro se the dismissal 
of an amended complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
 1
  
For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.  See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.     
Abdullah alleged two different sets of misconduct by the defendants.  He alleged 
that Wells Fargo did not respond to a single request for information about a small 
business loan, and that Bank of America 1) sent him information about a line of credit 
instead of a loan, and 2) that it did not respond to his application for a line of credit.  His 
amended complaint alleged that branch employees at both banks misinformed him about 
the minimum amount of revenue required to be eligible for a small business loan.  
Abdullah alleged that these actions were the equivalent of being denied the opportunity to 
apply for a loan program for which he was otherwise qualified.  He also alleged that 
absent another explanation from the defendants, he “can only conclude one purpose for 
this misinformation and denial, discrimination.”  Acting prior to service under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the District Court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to 
state a claim.  It also denied leave to further amend as futile.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 
F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader 
has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is 
                                              
1
 The District Court liberally construed appellant’s amended complaint as including 
claims under both statutes.  The complaint actually only cited to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
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plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  The standard 
requires a two-part analysis, first separating the complaint’s factual allegations from its 
legal conclusions, and second, taking only the factual allegations as true, deciding 
whether the plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim for relief.  See Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 To state a claim for violation of § 1981, a plaintiff must allege that 1) he is a 
member of a racial minority; 2) the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff on the basis of race; and 3) the discrimination negatively affected his ability to 
engage in one of the protected activities, including formation of a contract.  Brown v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001).
2
  To state a claim for violation of 
§ 2000d, a plaintiff must allege 1) intentional discrimination on the basis of race or 
national origin 2) by a program receiving federal funds.
3
  In either context, the standard 
for alleging intentional discrimination is the same.  See Pryor v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Here, appellant alleged that the only explanation for the appellees’ conduct was 
racial discrimination, but that is a legal conclusion not entitled to be assumed true.  See 
                                              
2
 Because it does not change our analysis, we do not analyze whether the test for a claim 
of racially discriminatory lending applies, as in either case the complaint’s deficiency in 
alleging racial discrimination would be fatal.  See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 
621 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2010). 
3
 We note that the District Court did not analyze, nor do we, whether the federally 
guaranteed loan program at issue here brings the defendants within the ambit of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a.  
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (holding that allegation in complaint that conduct was motivated 
“solely on account of religion, race, and/or national origin” was conclusory and “not 
entitled to be assumed true.”) (citation omitted).  Appellant failed to allege any facts 
supporting this conclusion.  See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff in racial discrimination claim must “establish 
some causal nexus between his membership in a protected class and” the adverse action).  
In his argument in support of this appeal, Abdullah alleged for the first time that he is 
African-American, that the relevant actors from the banks are Caucasian, and that the 
banks are aware of his race.  Even if these facts had been contained in his complaint, they 
would be the only facts from which to draw an inference of racial animus.  That the 
plaintiff and defendant are different races is not sufficient to plausibly state a claim of 
racial discrimination.  See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“Allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability or show the 
mere possibility of misconduct are not enough.”) (quotation omitted).      
 The District Court dismissed Abdullah’s original complaint for substantially the 
same reasons we have identified and gave appellant an opportunity to amend.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).  His amended 
complaint did not correct the deficiencies identified by the District Court.  In these 
circumstances, we conclude that the District Court need not have extended further leave 
to amend.  See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).      
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  For the reasons given, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
